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In recent times the tenab.ility of a "value neutral" 
conception of social inquiry has come under increasing 
scrutiny. The critique of the traditional model is 
grounded in a reappraisal of the relationship of facts 
and values on the levels of both methodology and lived 
experience. The present essay reviews some major ele-
ments in the critique of value neutrality, and on the 
basis of a reappraisal of the fact/value relationship, 
argues for an alternative conception of the objectivity 
of the complex process of social inquiry. 
I 
The traditional value neutral model of research in 
the human sciences is predicated on the assumption that 
the investigator can and does pursue his research into 
the social world in a totally disinterested way, unaf-
fected by his interests and values. This model presup-
poses also that the social world encompasses a domain 
of "brute facts," which are readily accessible via 
standard scientific procedures, generally construed on 
the model of those employed in the physical sciences. 
These social facts, it is assumed, can be identified, 
observed, and integrated in a meaningful way from a 
purely neutral viewpoint and in a quasi-mathematical 
fashion, and on this basis, yield a completely objec-
tive answer to the problem under investigation. Thus, 
as its name clearly implies, this conception of social 
research presupposes the exclusion of values as a pre-
condition of objectivity. 
However, the tenability and cogency of the value 
neutral model has been forcefully challenged by some 
social theorists who, in contrast, see the presence of 
valuational considerations as a necessary condition for 
the conduct of social inquiry. Thus, Gunnar Myrdal, 
for example, writes: 
we employ and we need value premises in making 
scientific observations of facts and in analyzing 
their causal interrelations. Chaos does not or-
ganize itself into cosmos. We need viewpoints 
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and they presume valuations. A 'disinterested 
social .science' is, from this viewpoint, pure 
nonsense. It never existed and it will never 
exist. 1 
The reasons for Myrdal's strong reaction to the tradi-
tional model become more apparent in the light of the 
following considerations. 
Experience with the process of social research 
makes it clear that neither research problems nor 
research frameworks present themselves to the scientist 
f-X n_ihilo- On the contrary, a problem area in need of 
investigation becomes apparent to the investigator only 
on the basis of certain questions and interests which 
the researcher has come to see as significant. In this 
way, even the identification of a research problem 
seems to depend on the interests and values of the 
scientist. A fortiori, the construction of an appro-
priate research framework for the investigation of a 
problem area is likewise guided by the researcher's 
questions and interests. But these interests which 
influence the selection of a research problem and the 
construction of a research framework clearly imply a 
context of meaning and value. Furthermore, the role of 
values in the conduct of scientific inquiry becomes 
more, rather than less, apparent when we consider what 
is involved in the collection of empirical data regard-
ing the phenomena under investigation. Here, it would 
seem that interests and values are necessarily involved 
in the selection of certain "facts" (from out of the 
virtual infinity of phenomena that impinge on our sen-
ses) as relevant to the resolution of the problem under 
investigation. That is to say, a viewpoint, a research 
interest, seems necessary to focus the selection and 
observation of relevant "facts," and thereafter, to 
systematically integrate these in a manner which could 
yield an answer to the research problem. As Myrdal 
notes, only a "naive empiricism" could maintain that 
"if we observe, and continue to observe, reality 
without any preconceptions, the facts will somehow or-
ganize themselves into a system which is assumed to 
pre-exist." In contrast to such a naive empiricism, 
however, Myrdal affirms that, "without questions there 
are no answers. And the answers are preconceived in 
the formulation of the questions. The questions ex-
press our interests in the matter. These interests can 
never be purely scientific. They are choices, the pro-
ducts of our valuations . . . . (TJhe factual analysis 
cannot be carried out except when guided by the value 
premise." 2 Finally, Myrdal concludes that, contrary to 
what is assumed by the value neutral conception, "we 
can strive to make our thinking rational in spite of 
this (viz. in spite of the necessary inclusion of 
values in social scientific analysis], but only by fac-
ing the valuations, not by evading them."1 (Surprising 
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though it may seem, in view of the fact that the origin 
of the notion of value neutrality is often attributed 
to him, Weber himself in places makes similar comments 
on the role of evaluative ideas in social research.)* 
In the light of such criticism of the value neutral 
model of inquiry, the present essay is devoted to the 
attempt to delineate a model of objective social in-
quiry which does not presuppose the exclusion of values 
and interests. 
However, further reflection reveals that the matter 
is still more complex than that posed by Myrdal and 
that Myrdal's analysis, critical though it is of the 
traditional empiricist framework, still, in a sense, 
remains within that framework. This is because Myr-
dal' s criticism still presupposes that there are separ-
ate domains of "facts" and "values" and that the former 
constitute the subject-matter of social inquiry. For 
some time now, however, phenomenologists, amongst 
others, have queried the tenability of the assumption 
that in the world of lived experience social facts and 
social values can be easily separated, and that the 
former, in contradistinction to the latter, constitute 
the object of research in the human sciences. The phe-
nomenological arguments in this regard have recently 
been forcefully articulated by Calvin Schrag in his 
radical reflections on the origin of the human sci-
ences . 5 
Schrag strongly challenges the tenability of initi-
ally positing two separate domains of facts and values. 
For once this assumption is made, all subsequent prob-
lems will be posed within an empiricist framework 
wherein "discrete, atomistic, and nonintentional" facts 
are already set in opposition to values because the 
former are already taken in "abstraction from the flow 
of lived-through experience as it emerges and develops 
in a concrete life-world" (pp. 84-86). To gain a 
proper perspective on the fact/value issue--one which 
holds open the possibility of a resolution of this vex-
ing problem because it has not prematurely presupposed 
a separation--it is necessary to return to reflect on 
the domain of lived experience, where, Schrag argues, 
we will find that facts and values are initially inte-
grated and inseparable. We must return, that is, to 
the integrated origin of facts and values "within the 
lived relations of man with his social world" (p. 85). 
This starting-point in the domain of lived experience 
is appropriate for the consideration of the methodolog-
ical relation of facts and values because it is also in 
our "prescientific concerns and interests" that the 
sciences have their origin and point of departure 
(e.g., pp. 68-69). 
Drawing on the analyses of earlier phenomenolo-
gists, Schrag argues that in the life world we encoun-
ter a domain of meaning-formation in which social 
events and phenomena are apprehended in a pre-thematic 
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fashion. In particular, on this level of lived ex-
perience, we find that "the embodied experiencer as 
living agent is not separated from his value-laden 
acts" and that this "originary setting or milieu of 
human thought, language, and action is at the same time 
a horizon of world-values." Valuation, we see, is it-
self "a mode of existing in the world" (p. 94). 
On the level of lived experience, then, it makes no 
sense to talk of facts in opposition to values nor of 
values in opposition to facts. Accordingly, on 
Schrag's account, there are no "brute" facts in the em-
piricist sense. The analysis of facts in the social 
world, if it is to be undertaken, must proceed in terms 
of what Schrag calls "world-facts." These "world 
facts," Schrag explains, "as distinct from the facts of 
an abstracted empiricism, are configurative rather than 
atomistic in character" (p. 88). As configuarative, 
world facts are present in our experience "as figures 
with horizional backgrounds"; as experienced, "they im-
plicate an experiencer," and they display "an inten-
tional structure in which understanding and interpreta-
tion are already operating." And, most importantly, 
within the sphere of world facts, facts and values are 
inseparable and equiprimordial (pp. 89-90). It is here 
that we discover "the sphere of origin in which config-
urative, intentional world-fact and world-valuation mix 
and mingle" (p. 94). 
Thus, on the basis of Schrag's analysis of the pri-
mordial inseparability of facts and values in the 
social world, we see that if "facts" are said to be the 
subject matter of social research, these cannot be 
"brute facts" in the empiricist sense but must rather 
be the "intentionality-laden world facts of lived 
experience." The question is, therefore, how the com-
plex lived experience of such fact/value "amalgams" can 
be objectively investigated via the procedures of the 
human sciences which themselves have their origin and 
point of departure in the prescientifi'c concerns and 
interests of the life world. We can begin to move tow-
ard a resolution of this problem by considering the 
manner in which the scientific approach to phenomena is 
constituted through a modification of our everyday ex-
perience of the life world. 
II 
In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger provides a com-
pressed, but extremely insightful, account of the man-
ner in which theoretical knowing arises through a 
modification of our everyday mode of being-in-the-world 
and of the ways of "seeing" characteristic of it.' 
Briefly stated, Heidegger's point is that when we re-
gard things from a theoretical or scientific point of 
view, we distance ourselves from direct practical en-
gagement with them: things-within-the-world become ob-
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jects of reflection rather than objects of direct cir-
cumspective concern. Thus, something (e.g., a hammer) 
which is ordinarily seen as an item of equipment in a 
context of involvement relationships"within an equip-
mental totality comes to be seen, from the scientific 
perspective, in isolation from these involvement rela-
tionships, as, e.g., an entity with "mass." Likewise, 
from the scientific perspective, things lose their 
equipmental locations, their places, and are seen in-
stead in abstracted spatio-temporal terms--as "world-
points" in no way distinguishable from others, and thus 
amenable to quantification in mathematical terms. In a 
word, the scientific way of seeing (in contrast to that 
of circumspective concern) "objectifies" the phenomena 
it encounters within-the-world. 
Heidegger further points out that the objectifica-
tion characteristic of the changeover from the everyday 
to the theoretical attitude arises through a "thematiz-
ing projection" of entities encountered within-the-
world. This thematization provides for a projection of 
world and the entities encountered within, it in a man-
ner amenable to scientific conceptualization and analy-
sis. Moreover, depending on what domain of entities, 
and what aspects of them, are specifically selected for 
investigation, thematization allows for the differenti-
ation of a wide range of (specific) natural and human 
sciences. Thereafter, once the domain of research has 
been clearly defined, the precise methods of investiga-
tion may be worked out in detail. Thus, the thematiza-
tion which characterizes the changeover from the ev-
eryday to the theoretical mode of "seeing" and "delib-
erating" accomplishes several things; it "comprises the 
original project of the object of investigation as 
such, the delineation of the domain of research, the 
determination of the methods to be used, the first 
orientation of the conceptual and discursive structure, 
and the linguistic means of expression. 1 1 7 
Elaborating on Heidegger's account of the themati-
zation which characterizes the scientific projection of 
entities within-the-world, Joseph Kockelmans has argued 
further that this thematization typically involves the 
procedures of formalization, functionalization, and 
quantification. Formalization here refers to the fact 
that in empirical science entities are typically deter-
mined and described with respect to their formal prop-
erties. Functionalization refers to the description 
and explanation of relations between formalized enti-
ties according to a general "if, then" scheme. 
Finally, quantification, a special mode of formalizing 
functionalization, permits the description of for-
malized phenomena and their interrelations by means of 
mathematical procedures.* The great merit of this line 
of analysis is that it explains how theoretical science 
with its formal explanatory apparatus is possible, and 
in particular, it clarifies the theoretical foundations 
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of the quantitative methodologies almost universally 
utilized today in the social as well as in the natural 
sciences. But, as Kockelmans notes, equally clearly, 
it points to the intrinsic limitations of the objecti-
fied empirical analysis of social phenomena: the phe-
nomena are inevitably reduced and abstract in compari-
son with their richness in the world of lived experi-
ence . 
Now, the reduction of phenomena to (merely) for-
malized and idealized elements, and their manipulation 
by purely logico-mathematical procedures may pose lit-
tle problem with regard to the relatively "inanimate" 
objects of natural science, but it does pose signifi-
cant problems for the human sciences whose subject mat-
ter bears on the meaning-laden events of the life 
world. In particular, how is the meaning-structure of 
man's orientation toward his life world and his ex-
perience of "intentionality-laden world facts" to be 
elucidated in the conduct of social inquiry, and how 
are the findings to be meaningfully related back to the 
living tradition from which they arise? 
In response to this question, Kockelmans has argued 
that, while the•logico-empirical methods of the human 
sciences yield worthwhile and productive results with 
respect to man's behavior in the world, there is a 
need, if our researches are to do full justice to the 
complexity of man's being-in-the-world, to supplement 
purely empirical techniques (those characterized by a 
thematization which involves formalization, function-
alization, and quantification) with the methods of 
"descriptive" and "interpretative" inquiry.' 
The descriptive phase of research has as its goal 
the uncovering of fundamental structures of man's lived 
experience in the social world. In addition to faith-
fully reflecting lived experience, these structures-
like those of a Husserlian "regional ontology"—should 
be of a general and necessary kind. 1 0 Once elicited, 
these structures both guide the process of concept and 
theory formation employed in the empirical phase of 
research, and aid in the elucidation of the social and 
historical meaning of phenomena, carried out in the in-
terpretative phase. 1 1 The more universal of Weber's 
"ideal types" furnish good examples of descriptive 
structures. 1 1 
In contrast to the investigation of universal 
structures carried out in the descriptive phase, the 
aim of the interpretative phase is "to understand the 
historical situation in which social phenomena arise 
and to show how they are incorporated in the context of 
a living tradition in which each individual of a 
society forms his identity." 1 1 The interpretative 
phase is thus centrally concerned with the elucidation 
of the meanings which social actions and events have in 
their societal and historical context. Without it, the 
full significance of these life world occurences would 
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remain unclarified and uncritically taken for granted. 
The more specific and situational of Weber's ideal 
types, those pertaining to concrete societies in their 
historical development, may serve as examples of inter-
pretative concepts."' 
The foregoing remarks serve to clarify the point 
that, while the human sciences have their origin and 
point of departure in the world of lived experience, 
they aim to distance themselves from direct practical 
involvement with the everyday world, so that they can 
investigate its meaning and structures in a controlled 
and systematic fashion. More specifically, however, it 
has been noted that with regard to social phenomena, 
casual explanatory schema which deal with reduced and 
formalized data can only accomplish so much. Without 
descriptive and interpretative procedures, the quanti-
fied data of the purely empirical phase of research 
will neither be grounded in the fundamental structures 
of the life world nor will they be adequate to eluci-
date the cultural and historical meanings of the pheno-
mena under investigation. Accordingly, if the 
"intentionality-laden world facts of lived experience," 
which are at the heart of social inquiry, are to be ap-
propriately grasped, understood, and elucidated, a tri-
partite approach—comprising descriptive and inter-
pretative as well as empirical moments—must be adopted 
with regard to the phenomena of the social world. 
With this established, it is time to pose afresh 
the question of the criteria of objectivity appropriate 
to research in the human sciences. At the outset, it 
will be recalled, we had occasion to query the value 
neutrality of even the empirical phase of research. We 
will be in a better position to shed some additional 
light on this problem if we first consider the question 
of the objectivity of the descriptive and interpreta-
tive phases. 
With respect to the descriptive phase, Kockelmans 
convincingly argues that the methods of free variation 
and especially of intentional analysis, -as outlined by 
Husserl, 1* constitute appropriate methodological proce-
dures for uncovering the general and necessary struc-
tures of life world phenomena—provided that, as argued 
by Merleau-Ponty," Husserl's conception of essences is 
reinterpreted from an existential point of view. 1 7 The 
structures thus elicited provide, as we have noted, the 
foundations for the process of concept and theory form-
ation with respect to the investigation of life world 
phenomena. Since the descriptive phase of research 
does not involve the use of mathematical type proce-
dures, the conception of objectivity here is non-
mathematical also. But, of course, there are other 
sorts of criteria operative to guide the impartiality 
and appropriateness of the analysis. Of particular im-
portance here is what Schutz called the "postulate of 
adequacy," a criterion to ensure the compatability of 
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the constructs of the social scientist with the con-
struct of everyday life. 1* Clearly, also, the logical 
postulates of non-contradiction, consistency, and co-
herence must be adhered to in this as well as in all 
phases of the research process. Furthermore, as al-
ready noted, the descriptive procedures have their 
"natural extention" in the interpretative phase, and 
accordingly, descriptive research is also governed by 
the canons and principles operative in the latter mode. 
The interpretative phase of social inquiry is con-
cerned, as we see, with the societal meanings of life 
world phenomena in their historical and cultural con-
text. Here, the attempt to preserve objectivity may 
seem to face its greatest challenge because we inquire 
directly into life world meanings and experiences which 
we have seen to be value-laden, and accordingly, in a 
sense, subjective. How, then, is objectivity to be 
preserved in this domain? In this regard, Kockelmans 
points out that, while the meaning of lived experience 
and its significance for social agents (actors) is 
never "objective" in the sense in which this term is 
used in the natural sciences, it is not really "sub-
jective" either-in that "this meaning is intersubjec-
tively shared by the members of a society and (is) thus 
intersubjectively accessible" to researchers. Kockel-
mans notes too that since it is the meanings and values 
of the social actors and not those of the scientist 
that are under investigation here, the threat of sub-
jectivism is not so great as it may at first sight 
appear. Nonetheless, criteria must be established for 
the impartial interpretation of the societal meaning of 
the events and phenomena of the life world. In this 
regard, Kockelmans counsels the use of the hermeneuti-
cal rules of "canons" "whose goal it is to achieve in-
tersubjective validity in regard to the results ob-
tained via this type of understanding." 1' In particu-
lar, five canons must be applied to ensure the inter-
subjective validity of these interpretations. 
Briefly stated, these canons require the following 
conditions to be met. 1 0 
1. With a view to preserving the autonomy of the 
object, a phenomenon must be understood "^ Trom within 
itself"; thus, the phenomenon itself remains the pri-
mary and final source as well as the criterion for the 
legitimacy of interpretation. 
2. Even where the original meanings of social ac-
tions or institutions have been covered up by secondary 
or tertiary layers of meaning, an interpretation must 
be searched for which makes the phenomena maximally 
reasonable (while, of course, preserving their auton-
omy) . 
3. Careful historical research must be undertaken, 
as necessary, so that the interpreter achieves the 
greatest possible familiarity with the phenomena whose 
meaning he wishes to understand interpretatively. 
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4. Especially important is the hermeneutic circle. 
This canon emphasizes that our interpretation of pheno-
mena must move back and forth—and in the process be 
corrected and deepened—between an understanding of the 
parts and an understanding of the whole. This 
process—appropriately termed a dialectical one—is 
"quasi-infinite, both on the side of our knowledge of 
the relevant wholes and on the side of their parts." 
Nonetheless, an interpretation can nearly always be 
reached which is genuinely adequate with regard to the 
phenomena under consideration. 
5. Finally, "in all these steps the interpreter 
must try to show the meaning of a phenomenon for his 
own situation." That is to say, the understanding of 
the historical genesis and development of the social 
behaviors, actions, or institutions must eventuate in 
an application of the results of these researches to 
the current situation. A risk of prejudice or too 
hasty application—one which violates a preceding 
canon—enters here, of course. But, if the inter-
preter's prejudices or pre-judgments are made explicit 
and are critically examined—and one might add, them-
selves intersubjectively validated—this risk can be 
virtually eliminated. 
In short, the interpretative canons outlined by 
Kockelmans enable the investigator to specify what 
Schutz calls the "objective meaning-contexts of subjec-
tive meaning-contexts." 2 1 Their applicability to the 
investigation of the rich and complex meanings of life 
world phenomena gains further support in the context of 
Ricoeur's analysis of meaningful action considered as a 
text. 2 2 Clearly, within the interpretative and 
descriptive phases they provide appropriate standards 
of objective research—especially when understood in 
the context of the intersubjective processes of valida-
tion which we shall consider shortly. First, however-
having now delineated the criteria of objectivity ap-
propriate to the descriptive and interpretative phases 
of inquiry—we must return to the consideration of the 
criteria of objectivity appropriate to the empirical 
phase as such. 
Typically, on the traditional value neutral ac-
counts, the criteria of empirical objectivity are those 
commensurate with the deductive-nomological model of 
explanation and the hypothetico-deductive model of 
theory-testing (not withstanding some acknowledged dif-
ficulties in "translating" their application from the 
realm of the natural to that of the human sciences). 
However, this preference for logico-mathematical cri-
teria leaves out of account the significant interpreta-
tive and valuational components involved in the in-
vestigation of empirical social phenomena, and on the 
whole seems to presuppose a ready-made domain of for-
malized data. Undoubtedly, the logico-mathematical 
criteria have significant application in the assessment 
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of formalized and quantified data. But, as was noted 
at the outset, these data themselves have significance 
only within a much larger domain of inquiry, one which 
involves numerous interpretative and valuational 
elements. Thus, as has been noted above, the identifi-
cation of a research problem, the construction of an 
appropriate research framework, the observation of 
selected phenomena, and the integration of results are 
all interpretative processes—and the logico-
mathematical manipulation of data has its significance 
only as part of this larger process. Indeed, while the 
performance of mathematical operations on the quanti-
fied data may itself be a purely mathematical affair, 
the quantification of phenomena is not; it too requires 
interpretative and selective procedures. 2 1 If this 
line of argument is correct, then the empirical phase 
of research is as much an interpretative as a logical 
process, and it too should incorporate the canons of 
"objectivity" relevant to the more clearly interpreta-
tive phases. 
The foregoing argument suggests that Ricoeur's text 
analogy and the specific procedures of interpretation, 
outlined by Keckelmans with respect to one aspect of 
the research process, are appropriate to all phases of 
research in the human sciences. Accordingly, as the 
development of Ricoeur's analogy suggests, the criteria 
of objectivity appropriate to social inquiry are better 
construed in terms of intersubjective validation which 
is arrived at through the mediation of conflicting in-
terpretations, rather than in purely logico-
mathematical terms. The context of validation, in 
other words, is that of argumentation, wherein all in-
terpretations may be challenged, and even "the final 
interpretation appears as a verdict to which it is 
possible to make appeal."2'' This model of validation 
does not imply a value neutral stance in the tradi-
tional sense; rather it implies a kind of (intersubjec-
tive) "hermeneutic circle" in which any unwarranted 
subjective intrusions in the interpretative process may 
be corrected through the process of argumentation and 
criticism, engaged in by the community of appropriately 
qualified investigators. 2 5 Furthermore, the context 
for the conduct of such validation procedures may ap-
propriately be elaborated in terms of Habermas's spe-
cification of an "ideal speech situation" and the 
validity claims relevant to it.2* Needless to mention, 
throughout the process of validation of interpretations 
through criticism and argument, the social world itself 
remains the object * of inquiry and hence, the 
"touchstone" for the "verification" of interpretations. 
The objectivity attained through the careful appli-
cation of interpretative procedures in all phases of 
the social research process does not require the 
(impossible) exclusion of all interests and values on 
the part of the investigator; and in this sense, the 
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process is not value neutral. However, it does require 
that all personal and subjective interests are subordi-
nated to the value of impartial norms of inquiry, as 
specified by the community of scientific investigators. 
Accordingly, while individual interests may play a part 
in the selection of a problem to be investigated and 
even in the decision as to the methodological proce-
dures to be employed in its investigation, the inquiry 
must, nevertheless, be carried through at every stage 
in accordance with the criteria of controlled and im-
partial investigation specified by the community of 
qualified investigators. The realization that these 
criteria are not (as the traditional model would have 
it) purely logical in character but inevitably involve 
valuational and interpretative components does not at 
all detract from the objectivity of social scientific 
research. For the interpretation of social phenomena, 
like the interpretations of texts, is a controlled 
procedure involving well-grounded criteria of adequacy 
and validity. In addition, as we have seen, the vali-
dation of the interpretative understanding and explana-
tion of life world phenomena is not ultimately the 
prerogative of an isolated investigator, but depends 
rather on a well-structured process of argumentation 
and criticism carried on within the community of quali-
fied investigators. Accordingly, the objectivity of 
social inquiry is attained rather through a process of 
controlled valuation than through one of value 
neutrality. 
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